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NOTE
CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v.
CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS: RESTRICTING RELATED SERVICES
UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.'
In 1975 Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (EAHCA)2 to ensure that children with disabilities, like all other chil-
dren, are provided an opportunity for "free appropriate public education.",
3
This goal was reaffirmed by the 1991 amendment, Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act (IDEA).4 By requiring an appropriate education, the
IDEA emphasizes the need to provide special education and related services
designed to accommodate the unique demands of children with disabilities.'
To achieve this goal, the IDEA provides federal funds to state and local
educational agencies6 and regulates special educational services for millions
of disabled children.7
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1988), amended as Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (IDEA). Throughout this Note, all references to
the Act, before and after the 1991 amendment, are to the IDEA. All sources cited in this
paper were written prior to the amendment; as such, they refer to the IDEA as EAHCA.
3. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(c) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
4. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
5. Id. See generally 20 U.S.C.S. § 1401(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991). For purposes of the
Act, the term "children with disabilities" means "children with mental retardation, hearing
impairment, including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments, includ-
ing blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain
injury, or other health impairment, or specific learning disabilities; and who by reason thereof
need special education and related services." Id.
6. Id. §§ 1411-1414 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
7. Perry Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v. Rowley:
Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L. REV. 466, 466-67 (1983).
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It is impossible to list every situation or service combination necessary to
provide an appropriate education for disabled children. Consequently, many
of the laws and regulations enacted by the U.S. Department of Education
and state educational agencies to guide administrators in implementing the
requirements of the IDEA are vague.' As a result, courts are often required
to make determinations as to the meaning of the Act's provisions on a case-
by-case basis.9
One provision of the IDEA that has created difficulty in both interpreta-
tion and administration is the requirement to provide related services.' °
Courts have been left in the untenable position of determining which services
Congress intended to fund under the IDEA and which services too heavily
burden the limited resources of those subject to the Act." This Note ex-
plores the ambiguous wording of the related services provision of the
IDEA' 2 and how it has been interpreted by the judiciary.' 3 In particular,
this Note focuses primarily on residential placements which, as related serv-
ices, are frequently denied to handicapped children' 4 because of the astro-
nomical costs involved. 15 This Note looks at the Supreme Court's approach
to the related service wording of the Act and analyzes the tests employed in
distinguishing between those services which are related and those which are
8. Allan G. Osborne, Jr., The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, 9 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 21 (1988).
9. Henry A. Beyer, Education for All Handicapped Children Act 1975-1989: A Judicial
History, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Sept. 1989, at 52; see also Osborne, supra note 8, at 23 (not-
ing the difficulty in drawing a line between school health services which are appropriate related
services, and medical services which are not part of the disabled child's educational needs).
10. "It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all children with disabilities have available
to them.., a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and re-
lated services designed to meet their unique needs .. " 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(c) (Law. Co-op.
1991).
11. Dixie S. Huefner, Special Education Residential Placements Under the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 411 (1989).
12. 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 1400(c), 1401(a)(17) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
13. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that the responsibility of a child's residential placement is placed upon the State Board of
Education); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub
nom., Scanlon v. Tokarcik, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982) (holding that clean intermittent catheteriza-
tion is a related service); Ahern v. Keene, 593 F. Supp. 902 (D. Del. 1984) (holding that state
has no duty to fund placement in a private institution where child is provided a free, appropri-
ate education); Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that related
services includes providing air conditioning to a nine-year-old boy unable to control his body
temperature).
14. See, e.g., Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d
635 (9th Cir. 1990); Vander Malle v. Ambach, 667 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); McKenzie
v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1983).
15. Huefner, supra note 11, at 413 (stating that expenses for residential placement typi-
cally range from $20,000 to $75,000 per year for each student).
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medical and therefore outside the intended scope of the IDEA. 6 Next, this
Note explores the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Clovis
Unified School District v. California Office Of Administrative Hearings,1 7
which rejected the previous tests of other circuits and the Supreme Court in
favor of its own test for determining the services provided for or excluded
from the scope of the IDEA."8 Finally, this Note concludes that the test
employed by the Clovis court, finding placement of a psychologically handi-
capped child in an acute care psychiatric hospital to be outside the scope of
the IDEA, 9 is too restrictive an interpretation of related services consider-
ing the findings and purposes of Congress in passing the IDEA and in later
reaffirming its position in the Americans with Disabilities Act.2"
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The IDEA is primarily funding legislation that conditions receipt of fed-
eral funds on the states acceptance and compliance with the regulatory pro-
visions of the Act.21
[T]he impetus for the Act came from two federal-court decisions
... which arose from the efforts of parents of... children [with
disabilities] to prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children
from the public schools. Congress was concerned about the appar-
ently widespread practice of relegating ... children [with disabili-
ties] to private institutions or warehousing them in special
classes.22
16. See, e.g., Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that clean
intermittent catheterization is a related service). But see Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176 (1982) (denying request for sign-language interpreter for deaf student).
17. 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
18. Id. at 642-43. The court rejected as arbitrary, Tatro, which held that medical services
are only those services which must be provided by licensed physicians. It also rejected Vander
Malle v. Ambach, 667 F. Supp. 1015, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), which ruled that where medical,
social, or emotional problems requiring hospitalization create, or are intertwined with, the
educational problem, the states remain responsible for the entire cost of the placement. Clovis,
903 F.2d at 642-43.
19. Clovis, 903 F.2d at 645.
20. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C.).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (1990); see also Charlotte J. Fraas, P.L. 94-142, The Education
For All Handicapped Children Act: Its Development, Implementation, and Current Issues,
(Feb. 10, 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with Congressional Research Service). In
fiscal year 1985, $1.135 billion was appropriated for the EAHCA, an amount which is only
approximately 9.7% of the national average per pupil expenditure (APPE), but the authoriza-
tion level was roughly $5 billion or 40% of APPE. Id.
22. School Comm. of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373 (1985) (referring to
Pennsylvania Ass'n. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972) and Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)).
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Congress enacted the IDEA in response to its findings that there were a
substantial number of children with disabilities in the United States23 whose
special educational needs were not being met,24 and that approximately one-
half of the children with disabilities in the United States were not receiving
appropriate educational services which would enable them access to equal
opportunities. 25 This means that all disabled children ages three through
twenty-one should be given access to public education that is appropriate for
their special needs and conducted in the least restrictive environment.26
Congress concluded that it is in the national interest to meet the educa-
tional needs of children with disabilities.27 Congress believed that these edu-
cational programs would increase the personal independence and the
productive capacities of disabled citizens.2" It further theorized that it could
avoid burdening public agencies and taxpayers with the staggering costs nec-
essary to support lifelong, dependent individuals, by providing the special
educational and support services needed to help foster independent and pro-
ductive citizens.29
Through the provisions of the IDEA, Congress placed the burden on state
and local educational agencies to provide all special educational and related
services, except medical treatment, to disabled students, without charge.30
The IDEA provides for the mainstreaming 31 of handicapped children so that
they can become productive and integrated citizens. This ensures that the
child is placed in the least restrictive environment by requiring that "to the
maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . ..are educated
with children who are not disabled. ' '32 The Act also recognizes that for
23. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (noting that there are more than eight
million children with disabilities in the United States).
24. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
25. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
26. Fraas, supra note 21, at 1; see also REED MARTIN, EDUCATING HANDICAPPED CHIL-
DREN: THE LEGAL MANDATE 85-95 (1979) (explaining that least restrictive means a setting
which deviates least from a regular, nondisabled program).
27. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(b)(9) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
28. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1425, 1433; see also Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F.
Supp. 279, 296 n.50 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (stating that the President's Committee on Mental Retar-
dation estimates that seventy-five percent of the nation's mentally disabled citizens could sup-
port themselves if proper training is given to them early in their lives).
29. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1433-34.
30. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1412(6) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
31. Mainstreaming refers to the level of contact with nondisabled people that children
with disabilities experience as part of the educational process. Laura Gangemi, Comment,
After Rowley. The Handicapped Child's Right to an Appropriate Education, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 321 (1984).
32. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1412(5)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1991). The state must adopt procedures to
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some special education students, the least restrictive environment is a private
school or facility rather than a day school program.3 3
The IDEA defines special education as "specially designed instruction, at
no cost to the parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a child with
a disability, including: A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the
home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and B) instruction
in physical education."34 Related services are those necessary to allow a
disabled child to benefit from special education. 35 Examples of such services
include transportation, physical therapy, and medical and counseling serv-
ices.36 However, medical services are limited to those necessary for diagnos-
tic and evaluation purposes.3 7
State and local educational agencies have been reluctant to recommend
and pay for residential programs because the costs of such programs burden
already tight educational budgets. 38 However, the IDEA requires the school
system to pay for public or private residential placement, including room
and board and other nonmedical expenses, if the program is necessary to
deliver special education to a disabled child. 39 Consequently, when residen-
tial placement is deemed necessary, school officials frequently argue that the
placement is not necessary to provide special education. They contend that
although the special education must be delivered in a residential setting, the
assure that disabled children are mainstreamed to the maximum extent possible. Any other
alternative is restrictive. A restrictive environment limits the way teachers and students view
the child and can injure the child's chances of becoming self-sufficient. MARTIN, supra note
26, at 85. Mainstreaming is a response to the practice of placing handicapped children in
institutions. Id. at 86-89.
33. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i) (Law. Co-op. 1991). The Act requires private schools
and facilities to be provided at no cost to the parents or guardians as long as the children are
placed in the institutions by the state or the appropriate educational agency as a means of
providing special education and related services to all children with disabilities. Id.
34. Id. § 1401(a)(16).
35. Id. § 1401(a)(17).
36. Id.
The term "related services" means transportation, and such developmental, correc-
tive, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psy-
chological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including
therapeutic recreation and social work services, and medical and counseling services,
including rehabilitation counseling, except that such medical services shall be for
diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a
disability to benefit from special education....
Id.
37. Id.
38. Huefner, supra note 11, at 413; see also Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of
Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1990) (cost of residential placement for the
disabled child at the psychiatric hospital was $150,000 per year).
39. Huefner, supra note 11, at 416 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1991)).
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setting is required primarily for medical or family reasons and not for educa-
tional reasons." If the educational agency is successful with this argument,
the cost of the placement will be borne by the parents of the child with a
disability.
4 1
II. EARLY ATrEMPTS AT DEFINING RELATED SERVICES
Since the IDEA was first passed in 1975, courts have attempted to devise
a standard for defining appropriate education in accordance with Congres-
sional intent so that they may ultimately determine which services are within
the scope of the IDEA and which are not.42 One area that causes many
problems for courts is determining whether residential placement is a special
educational necessity, and therefore the responsibility of state education
agencies, or a placement primarily for noneducational purposes, and thus
the responsibility of the disabled child's parents.43 For children suffering
from severe emotional disturbances or multiple disabilities, application of
the related services provision of the IDEA, particularly separating medical
and therapeutic needs from educational requirements, is extremely
difficult.44
In North v. Board of Education,4 5 the court considered whether residential
placement was necessary, and if so, whether the District of Columbia Board
of Education was required to pay for the placement.' Ty North was a mul-
tiply disabled sixteen-year-old who had a severe emotional disturbance,
learning disabilities, and experienced epileptic seizures.47 Ty's Individual-
ized Education Program (IEP) 48 recommended residential placement where
40. Id. at 414; see also McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding
that where placement in the residential hospital was for medical and not educational reasons,
student's hospitalization was not a related service which school system was required to fund).
41. Huefner, supra note 11, at 416.
42. Zirkel, supra note 7, at 472-73.
43. See generally Huefner, supra note 11, at 411 (discussing special education residential
placements).
44. Id. at 414.
45. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
46. Id. at 139.
47. Id. at 137-38.
48. IEP's must outline the educational goals of the child, as well as the instructional
methods and supplementary related services to be used in meeting the child's special educa-
tional needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1990); see also Martin Gerry, Procedural Safeguards
Insuring that Handicapped Children Receive a Free Appropriate Public Education, 7 NAT'L
INFO. CENTER FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN & YOUTH 1, 2 (1987). Direct participation by
parents in the development of the IEP and annual review of the IEP is also required. Written,
informed parental consent is required before the school conducts a formal evaluation and as-
sessment prior to placing a child in a program which provides special education and related
services. Additionally, parents have the right to inspect and review any educational records
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ucational opportunities62 mandated by Brown v. Board of Education.63 Sec-
ond, the provision of educational services was intended to increase the
productive capacities of those with disabilities." Third, the Act acknowl-
edged the need for the federal government to expand its fiscal role in order to
protect the rights of children with disabilities.65 The court stated that Con-
gress recognized the "broad range of special needs presented by... children
[with disabilities], the lack of agreement within the medical and educational
professions on what constitutes an appropriate education, and the tradition
of state and local control over educational matters .... 66
The eleven-year-old boy in Kruelle suffered physical and mental disabili-
ties67 and needed full-time care in order to learn. 6 The Kruelle court, agree-
ing with North, held that the unseverability of the child's emotional, social,
medical, and educational disabilities was the "very basis for holding that the
services are an essential prerequisite for learning." '69 The Kruelle court fur-
ther stated, that "[w]here basic self-help and social skills such as toilet train-
ing, dressing, feeding, and communication are lacking, formal education
begins at that point."7 °
The court placed the burden for coordinating efforts and financial ar-
rangements on the State Board of Education.7 The IDEA explicitly man-
dates that the primary responsibility for providing a free, appropriate, public
education for children with disabilities rests with the state.72 "The legisla-
tive history indicates that ... [Congress] considered the establishment of a
single agency on which to focus the responsibility for assuring the right to
education of all ... children [with disabilities] to be of paramount impor-
62. Id. at 690.
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
64. Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 691 (citing S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975),
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433).
65. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N., 1425, 1431).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 688. The child suffered from profound retardation and cerebral palsy. He had
social skills of a six-month-old and an I.Q. below 30. He could not walk, dress himself, or eat
unaided. He was not toilet trained, and could not speak. Id.
68. Id. at 694.
69. Id.; see also North v. Board of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
70. Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693 (citing Battle v. Commonwealth, 629 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir.
1980)).
71. Id. at 696.
72. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1412(6) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
The state educational agency shall be responsible for assuring that.., all educational
programs for children with disabilities within the State, including all such programs
administered by any other State or local agency, will be under the general supervision
of the persons responsible for educational programs for children with disabilities in
the State educational agency ....
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he could receive medical supervision, special education, and psychological
support.49 By order of a hearing officer, Ty was placed in a private residen-
tial treatment facility by the educational agency in charge.5 ° However, he
soon had to be discharged due to his severe emotional problems."1 His fam-
ily then placed him in a different residential setting that provided the neces-
sary therapy, education, and medical attention. 2
The Education Board argued that it was Ty's emotional problems which
necessitated the residential placement, and that the Board was only responsi-
ble for meeting his educational needs.5 3 The Board maintained that Ty's
educational requirements could be satisfied in a less restrictive, 54 special edu-
cation day program. 5
The court interpreted the IDEA as requiring the Board to administer all
educational programs for children with disabilities within its jurisdiction.5 6
Furthermore, the court held that where residential care was required to ac-
commodate Ty, it must be at no cost to his parents.5 7 Finally, the court held
that where Ty's needs for his social, emotional, medical, and educational
problems were so intertwined,58 the school system was required to pay for
the residential academic program.59
In Kruelle v. New Castle County School District,6° the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals expanded the North court's holding. The Kruelle court discussed
three reasons for the passage of the IDEA. 6' First, the Act was intended to
secure for children with disabilities the right to publicly-supported equal ed-
maintained by the school district. The school must also give written notice to the parents
before initiating or changing the identification or educational placement of a child. Id.
49. North, 471 F. Supp. at 138.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 140.
54. Id. at 139; see also 20 U.S.C.S. § 1412(5)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1991); Mills v. Bd. of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 880 (D.D.C. 1972) (contemplating that children should be educated
in the least restrictive environment that appropriately meets their needs).
55. 471 F. Supp. at 139.
56. Id. at 141. The school district argued that Ty's disabilities were emotional and there-
fore the responsibility of the Department of Human Resources; the Department of Human
Resources argued that Ty's disabilities were educational in nature and therefore the responsi-
bility of the School District. Id. See generally 20 U.S.C.S. § 1412(6) (Law. Co-op. 1991)
(describing educational agency responsibilities towards children with disabilities).
57. 471 F. Supp. at 142; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1991).
58. "Realistically it [was] not possible for the court to perform the Solomon-like task of
separating them." 471 F. Supp. at 141.
59. Id. at 140.
60. 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
61. Id. at 690-91.
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IEP. 10
3
This line of Supreme Court decisions affirmed the right of students with
disabilities to receive appropriate special education and related services. 4
Interpreting the Statute rather strictly, the Court held in each case that stu-
dents with disabilities must have meaningful access to educational pro-
grams105 even though school districts are not required to maximize disabled
students' potential."°6 Interpreting the related services provision broadly,
the Court in Tatro affirmed the IDEA's guarantee of a free appropriate pub-
lic education for all children with disabilities.'° 7 As Justice Rehnquist stated
in School Committee, "The Act was intended to give .. .children [with
disabilities] both an appropriate education and a free one; it should not be
interpreted to defeat one or the other of those objectives."' 08 Despite the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the IDEA's related services require-
ment, state and federal courts are still struggling to determine the scope of
this provision.
In Doe v. Anrig,"°9 the father of a twelve-year-old boy, Timothy, sought
reimbursement from the school board for the cost of placing him in the hos-
pital. 10 As a result of illicit drug abuse, the young boy was unable to per-
form in school and was voluntarily admitted to a private psychiatric
hospital."' He was diagnosed as a chronic schizophrenic, undifferentiated
type." 2 Treatment at the hospital included medication to control the boy's
self-destructive behavior, individual psychotherapy, group therapy, and
physical education." 3 The Board of Special Education denied the reim-
bursement request because the placement and the related services provided,
mainly psychotherapy, were not primarily for the purpose of enabling him to
benefit from educational tutoring. The Board based its findings on the fact
that Timothy was so ill that education was not a serious possibility." 4
The court rejected the Board's reasoning, stating that there is no federal or
103. Id. at 370-71.
104. See generally School Comm. of Burlington v. Deptartment of Educ., 471 U.S. 359
(1985); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
105. See generally Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
106. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199.
107. Osborne, supra note 8, at 23-24.
108. School Comm. of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. at 373.
109. 651 F. Supp. 424 (D. Mass. 1987).
110. Id. at 426-28.
111. Id. at 426.
112. Id. at 427. Timothy was hearing voices, clearly psychotic, unable to perform in
school, and physically self-destructive. Id. at 426-27.
113. Id. at 427.
114. Id. at 430-31.
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that this access was to be meaningful.9 In Tatro, the Court created a two-
part test to determine which services are related services. First, to be a re-
lated service, a service must assist the disabled child in benefiting from spe-
cial education.92 Second, the service must not be a medical service going
beyond diagnosis or evaluation" which is specifically excluded by the
IDEA.94 Under this test, a service that enables a child to remain in school
during the day is a related service required by the IDEA because it allows
for meaningful access to public education.95
Applying this test, the Court determined that CIC did assist Amber in
benefiting from special education and that while a health service performed
by a licensed physician would be excluded, 96 catheterization, because it can
be performed by a lay person or school nurse, qualifies as a related service
under the IDEA.97 The Court recognized that Congress did not intend to
exclude traditional school health services as medical services.98 "Services
like [catheterization] that permit a child to remain at school during the day
are no less related to the effort to educate than are [diagnostic and evalua-
tive] services that enable the child to reach, enter, or exit the school."99
Finally, the Supreme Court, in School Committee v. Department of Educa-
tion, "° held that reimbursement of expenses is generally available to parents
who unilaterally place their disabled child in a private school that is later
determined to be an appropriate placement for the child.' ° This case arose
when the parents of a learning disabled child unilaterally placed the child in
a private school for children with such disabilities after disagreeing with the
school board's proposal to place the child in public school.'0 2 The Court
reasoned that reimbursement merely required the school system to pay ex-
penses that it should have been paying all along if it had developed a proper
91. Id. at 891 (citing Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)).
92. Id. at 890 (citing with approval, the Court of Appeals in Tatro v. State of Texas, 703
F.2d 823, 831 (1983)) (CIC is a supportive service required to assist a disabled child in benefit-
ting from special education.).
93. Id. at 891-93.
94. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1401(a)(17) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
95. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891; see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. Congress intended to make
public education available to disabled children. The burden imposed on the state is to make
access to education meaningful. Id.
96. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892-93.
97. Id. at 893-94.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 891. The Court interpreted the EAHCA, which defines related services. For a
definition of related services, see supra note 36.
100. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
101. Id. at 361-63.
102. Id. at 369.
1992]
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state requirement that related services be primarily for educational pur-
poses. 115 Instead, the court relied upon Tatro, which held that a service
need only enable a child to benefit from special education to be a related
service, and required the school board to reimburse the boy's father for psy-
chotherapy expenses. 116  This treatment enabled Timothy to benefit from
special education and was therefore a related service under federal and state
law.117 However, room and board costs were not reimbursed because the
hospital was not a state approved special education facility as required by
the state statute."18
Following the reasoning of Kruelle,1 9 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Drew P. v. Clarke County School District 120 held that in order for a
school district to discharge its duty of educating an autistic child suffering
from severe mental retardation, it must provide a setting in which the child
can receive an educational benefit. 12' Evidence was presented that autistic
children require around-the-clock expert educational supervision so that
they can progress. 122 The court determined an appropriate educational set-
ting to be residential placement' 23 and required the school district to reim-
burse the parents of the child for costs of previous placements. 24
In Vander Malle v. Ambach, 2 5 a psychologically disabled child required
residential placement in a psychiatric hospital.126 The school district argued
that because the child's behavioral and emotional disability prevented him
from attending the school located on the hospital grounds, the child was
uneducable. Therefore, the district had no responsibility for any of the costs
of the placement. 127 The school district claimed that it satisfied the require-
ments of the IDEA by arranging to provide educational services free of
charge. 128
The Vander Malle court held that a "[s]tate may not escape responsibility
115. Id. at 431.
116. Id. (citing Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984)) (holding that clean
intermittent catheterization (CIC) was a related service even though the primary purpose of
the procedure was not educational).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 430.
119. Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
120. 877 F.2d 927 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
121. Id. at 928, 930.
122. Id. at 930-31.
123. Id. at 931.
124. Id.
125. 667 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1036-37.
128. Id.
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for the costs properly associated with a residential placement simply by stat-
ing that the placement addresses physical, emotional, psychological, or be-
havioral difficulties rather than or in addition to educational problems."' 29
The true question, the court found, was whether placement was necessary
for educational purposes, or solely a response to medical, social, or emo-
tional problems that are separate from learning.' 3 ° The court held that the
State could not satisfy its duty by making available, in another setting, pre-
cisely the form of instruction which was not previously effective.13' Cogni-
zant that Congress explicitly did not intend for school districts to bear the
medical costs of children with disabilities, 132 the court remanded the case to
determine what fraction of the total costs of placement was purely medical
services and thus not chargeable to the school district under the IDEA.13 3
IV. CLovIs: RESTRICTING RELATED SERVICES
The majority of cases until recently had two tests for determining what
constitutes related services under the IDEA. The first test, devised by the
Supreme Court in Tatro, is two pronged: is the service a support service
which assists the child with a disability in benefiting from special education?;
if so, is the service a medical service that goes beyond diagnosis or evalua-
tion? 134 To apply this test, it is necessary to determine if the service required
must be performed by a licensed physician. If so, the service is presumed to
go beyond diagnosis and evaluation and is not covered under the IDEA. If
the service can be provided by a layperson or school nurse, then it is consid-
ered a support service and therefore covered by the Act. 135
The second test, suggested in North 136 and applied in Kruelle,137 deter-
mines whether the disabled child's emotional, social, medical, and educa-
tional needs are so intertwined that they are to be treated as unseverable. 1
38
In this case, if the appropriate placement is a residential setting, it is a re-
lated service. 139 Rejecting the tests used by other courts, the Ninth Circuit
129. Id. at 1039.
130. Id. at 1040 (citing School Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985)).
131. Id. at 1041.
132. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1401(a)(17) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
133. 667 F. Supp. at 1042.
134. 468 U.S. at 890. In Tatro, the Court deferred to Department of Education regula-
tions. Id. at 892. The regulations define related services to include school health services. 34
C.F.R. § 300.13(a) (1991). School health services are defined as services provided by a quali-
fied school nurse or other qualified individual. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(4) (1991).
135. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 893.
136. 471 F. Supp. 136, 141 (D.D.C. 1979).
137. 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981).
138. Huefner, supra note 11, at 411.
139. Id.
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out in Tatro.'54 The court believed that the supportiveness criteria of the
first part of the Tatro test was far too inclusive in light of the IDEA's explicit
exclusion of medical services.' 55 The court reasoned that under the Tatro
test, all medical services could be considered support services which assist a
child with a disability in receiving a special education.' 6 Furthermore, the
court rejected the second prong of the Tatro test-that services provided by
a licensed physician are deemed to be medical, but if provided by a layperson
or nurse, they are related services.' 57 The court reasoned that this distinc-
tion was too arbitrary to be useful.' 5 8
Clovis rejected the reasoning of the prevailing weight of authority, that
where medical, social, or emotional disabilities requiring hospitalization are
intertwined with the educational disabilities, the entire cost of the placement
remains the responsibility of the school district."' Prior to Clovis, courts
were unwilling if not unable to make a distinction between psychological and
physiological disabilities in determining which services are related and
which are medical. '" The reasoning was that the purpose of the IDEA is to
154. Id. at 643; see Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890 (1984) (holding that
clean intermittent catheterization is a related service, even though the primary purpose of the
procedure was not educational); see also Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir.
1983); Papcodo v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn. 1984); Christopher T. v. San Fran-
cisco Unified Sch. Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1982). All of these cases found that the
handicapped plaintiff needed continuous and consistent programming around the clock. The
underlying notion is that some children have educational needs that far exceed the need for
academic programming, and when that is the case, the academic, emotional, and social needs
are unseverable. But see Ahern v. Keene, 593 F. Supp. 902 (D. Del. 1984); McKenzie v.
Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1983); Cain v. Yukon, 556 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. Okla.
1983), aff'd, 775 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1985). In Ahern, a child with Down's Syndrome was
placed in a residential program by her parents. The court concluded that the residential aspect
of the placement was not designed to carry out specific educational objectives, but was rather
intended to provide social and recreational activities. The court also found that the school
district was prepared to address the child's emotional and social needs, and that her emotional
needs were segregable from the learning process. Thus, the residential placement was not
required in order to deliver an appropriate education. Ahern, 593 F. Supp. at 913-14. In
McKenzie, the court concluded that the decision to hospitalize was made so that the child
could obtain medical treatment for acute mental illness and not to support a special education
program. Mckenzie, 566 F. Supp. at 411-12.
155. Clovis, 903 F.2d at 643; see 20 U.S.C.S. § 1401(a)(17) (1991).
156. 903 F.2d at 643.
157. 468 U.S. at 893.
158. Clovis, 903 F.2d at 643.
159. Id. (quoting Vander Malle v. Ambach, 667 F. Supp. 1015, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
160. Id. at 644.
We can not accept as reasonable a definition of "medical" which ultimately turns on
the distinction between physiological illness and mental illness. Such a definition
would mandate huge expenditures by local school boards aimed at "curing" psychi-
atric illness but not require similar expenditures for treating children with physical
problems who require the more traditional "medical" services.
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Court of Appeals in Clovis Unified School District v. California Office of Ad-
ministrative Hearings,14 formulated a new test which considerably restricts
the related services that a school district must supply for a student with a
disability. 14
Clovis focused on the nature of the services provided to a young girl,
Michelle Shorey, in an acute care psychiatric hospital. 142 As a result of
early childhood abuse and neglect, Michelle developed serious emotional dis-
abilities. 143 Michelle's parents enrolled her in a mental health day program,
but, because of her destructive behavior, she was moved to a mental health
residential treatment program. 1" While Michelle performed adequately in
the classroom, her emotional condition continued to deteriorate."4 5 Within
a year, the Mental Health Director informed Michelle's parents that her be-
havior had deteriorated to the extent that the staff could no longer control
her. 146 They recommended placement in an acute care facility.'47 Michelle
was discharged from the mental health facility and placed at King's View
Hospital, an acute care psychiatric hospital. 41
Michelle's parents paid the costs of her placement through their private
medical insurance until that coverage was exhausted.' 49 Personnel from the
Clovis Unified School District recommended two schools for Michelle, the
State Diagnostic School and Re-Ed West, a residential school in Sacra-
mento, California.' 50 Michelle's parents did not believe that either school
could provide Michelle with an appropriate education and rejected both pro-
posals. '5' Instead, they requested that the School District pay for Michelle's
placement at King's View,' 5 2 but it refused.' 53
In determining whether hospitalization at King's View constituted either
residential placement or a related service for which the School District was
required to pay for under the IDEA, the court rejected the two part test set
140. 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
141. Id. at 643-44.
142. Id. at 645. At King's View Hospital, Michelle's program consisted of a residential,
therapeutic program coordinated with on-grounds classroom program; she received individual
therapy from licensed or trained medical staff. Id.
143. Id. at 639.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. The School District's recommendation would cost approximately $50,000, while
the King's View placement cost about $150,000 per year.
153. Id.
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provide access to education for all handicapped children on an equal basis,
even to the extent of providing for support services traditionally not consid-
ered to be educational.1
61
The Clovis court, however, focused on whether Michelle's placement was
necessary for educational purposes, or whether it was in response to medical,
social, or emotional disabilities that were distinguishable from the learning
process. 162 Application of this analysis resulted in a determination that
Michelle's placement was not a related service within the scope of the Act
for several reasons.' 63 First, Michelle's hospitalization was caused by an
acute psychiatric crisis, which rendered her uncontrollable and unable to
benefit from education. "64 Second, the program at the hospital implemented
for Michelle was not established according to an IEP, but was determined by
a medical team, supervised by a licensed physician. The amount of time that
Michelle spent in the classroom was decided by the hospital staff and de-
pended upon her other treatment needs. 165 Because of the intensity of the
psychotherapy provided to Michelle, 166 the court found these services ad-
dressed a medical crisis. 167 Third, the court placed great weight on the fact
that the cost of King's View, one hundred fifty thousand dollars per year,
was due to its status as a medical facility and not an educational establish-
ment.'6 Finally, the court found that the hospital did not provide any edu-
cational services to Michelle. Instead, it found that her educational needs
were addressed by a tutor sent to the hospital by the Clovis School Dis-
trict. 69 The court concluded that the lack of educational services provided
by King's View indicated that the room and board were for medical reasons
as opposed to educationally related needs.' 7 0
Understandably, Michelle had medical needs, but if these needs could not
be addressed separately from her educational demands, then a physician-
not an educator-is in the better position to supervise a comprehensive pro-
gram that satisfies all of her special requirements. Despite the Supreme
Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 643. The court dismissed the line of reasoning that there is no way for a court
to separate educational from noneducational needs when educational, social, physical, and
medical needs are intertwined, by simply shifting its focus away from this inquiry without
answering the underlying problem. Id. (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 645.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Michelle received six hours of intensive psychotherapy each day. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 639, 645.
169. Id. at 646.
170. Id. at 647.
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Court's broad definition of related services under the IDEA, and some
school district's willingness to pay for services required for children with
disabilities,1 7 decisions such as Clovis indicate that the standard for deter-
mining what constitutes adequate special education is beginning to vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Consequently, courts must determine a
uniform standard as to the scope of related services that must be provided by
the school. 172
V. CONCLUSION
Clovis narrowly interprets the residential placement provisions of the
IDEA.173 In so doing, the court has restricted the related services that
would otherwise be available to children with disabilities. The court ignored
previous precedent by denying a disabled child's placement as a related ser-
vice. The court rejected the supportive services test developed in Tatro by
reasoning that although a child requiring constant medical attention cannot
be educated without such services, it is not the responsibility of the school
district to provide this maintenance care. 174 The court then dismissed the
line of cases holding that where a child's physical, social, emotional, and
educational needs are so intertwined that they are unseverable, the school
district shall remain responsible for providing the needed services. The
court reasoned that it would not accept a definition of medical that distin-
guishes between physiological illness and mental illness because this defini-
tion mandates huge expenditures by schools aimed at curing psychiatric
illness, but does not require similar expenditures for treating children with
physical problems. This contravenes the IDEA's goal of treating all chil-
dren with disabilities equally.
175
The Clovis court developed a test that focuses on whether the programs
administered by the residential facility are controlled by an educational
agency or a medical staff. ' 76 The court's test necessitates that the placement
be primarily for special education reasons. 77 The court believed that if the
primary services are medical or therapeutic and that specially designed in-
struction has become a supplementary service, then the placement should
171. Cf Renee Sanchez, D.C. Will Pay For Girl to Attend Private School in Maryland,
WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1990, at B4 (stating that the District of Columbia agreed to pay $12,000
in tuition for child with learning disability).
172. Beyer, supra note 9, at 58.
173. Clovis, 903 F.2d at 643-47.
174. Id. at 643.
175. Id. at 644.
176. Id. at 645-47.
177. Id. at 647.
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not be considered a special education residential placement."7 8
The reasoning applied in Clovis is inconsistent with the purposes and find-
ings of Congress in enacting the IDEA.'79 Congress was concerned with the
lack of educational opportunities available to children with disabilities.' so
In mandating that disabled children be provided special education and re-
lated services, the Act requires that state and local educational agencies pro-
vide individualized education, tailored to meet the unique needs of each
child. 181 Family members seeking to improve the education of students with
severe disabilities have long realized that the concept of special education
178. Huefner, supra note 11, at 437.
179. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(b)-(c) states that:
(b)(l) there are more than eight million children with disabilities in the United
States today;
(2) the special educational needs of such children are not being fully met;
(3) more than half of the children with disabilities in the United States do not
receive appropriate educational services which would enable them to have
full equality of opportunity;
(4) one million of the children with disabilities in the United States are excluded
entirely from the public school system and will not go through the educa-
tional process with their peers;
(5) there are many children with disabilities throughout the United States partic-
ipating in regular school programs whose handicaps prevent them from hav-
ing a successful educational experience because their handicaps are
undetected;
(6) because of the lack of adequate services within the public school system, fam-
ilies are often forced to find services outside the public school system, often
at great distance from their residence and at their own expense;
(7) developments in the training of teachers and in diagnostic and instructional
procedures and methods have advanced to the point that, given appropriate
funding, State and local educational agencies can and will provide effective
special education and related services to meet the needs of children with
disabilities;
(8) State and local educational agencies have a responsibility to provide educa-
tion for all children with disabilities, but present financial resources are inad-
equate to meet the special educational needs of children with disabilities; and
(9) it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and
local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of children
with disabilities in order to assure equal protection of the law.
(c) It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all children with disabilities have
available to them, ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special
education and relates services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the
rights of children with disabilities and their parents or guardians are protected, to
assist States and localities to provide for the education of all children with disabili-
ties, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate children with
disabilities.
20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(b)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
180. See id. § 1400(b).
181. See id. § 1401(a)(20).
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and related services encompasses the development of self-care skills. "2 The
question we should ask is what is the appropriate educational program, and
how such a program can be provided to meet the needs of the student.183
The IDEA is regarded as a landmark law in the establishment of equal edu-
cation for school-aged children with disabilities.
1 14
Even though more disabled children are now receiving special education
than ever before, access for some is a matter of chance. Some disabled chil-
dren are still excluded from special education because not enough programs
are available, local school districts limit their programs because of funding
problems, and state eligibility standards for special education are sometimes
inconsistent with the IDEA." 5 The intent of Congress in enacting the
IDEA was to encourage educational equality for disabled children through a
permanent, broad-scale federal assistance program.' s6
The findings and purposes of Congress when enacting the Americans
With Disabilities Act (1990)87 illustrate the continuing problems that peo-
ple with handicaps face in the United States. Approximately forty-three mil-
lion Americans have physical or mental disabilities.188 Historically, society
has isolated and segregated disabled individuals and, despite some improve-
ments, such discrimination continues to be a serious and pervasive social
problem.'8 9 This discrimination persists. in critical areas such as employ-
ment, housing, public accommodations, and education, among others.,9 In-
dividuals who experience discrimination on the basis of their disability often
have no legal recourse and continue to encounter discrimination in various
182. 134 CONG. REC. S16,242 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Senator Harkin ex-
pressing his concern over the ruling in Timothy W. v. Rochester School District, 875 F.2d 954
(2d Cir. 1988), which found that a public school district is not required to provide educational
programming and services to a severely disabled child because of the severity of his disability).
183. Id. at S16,243.
We find it a particularly grave cause for concern that more than a dozen years after
enactment of Public Law 94-142 a Federal judge would exclude a severely disabled
child in need of special education and related services from public education. No
disabled child is too retarded, too physically disabled, or too much of a behavior
problem to be excluded from or denied his or her right to a free, appropriate public
education on the basis of the severity of his or her disability.
Id.
184. Fraas, supra note 21, at 1.
185. Id. at 42-43 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IPE-81-1, DISPARITIES
STILL EXIST IN WHO GETS SPECIAL EDUCATION, (1981) (Report to the Chairman, Subcom-
mittee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives).
186. Id. at 5.
187. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)-(b), 104 Stat.
327, 328-29 (1988) (to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.).
188. Id. § 2(a)(1).
189. Id. § 2(a)(2).
190. Id. § 2(a)(3).
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forms, including: intentional exclusion; architecture, transportation, and
communication barriers; overprotective rules and policies; and segrega-
tion. ' Disabled individuals are often relegated to lesser services, programs,
activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.1 92 The continued existence
of discrimination and prejudice denies disabled people the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis. 93 This denial results in dependency and non-
productivity of disabled persons, costing the United States billions of dollars
in unnecessary expenses.' 94
By enacting the Americans With Disabilities Act, Congress has provided
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for eliminating discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. In addition, it has set forth clear,
strong, consistent, and enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against disabled individuals and has ensured that the federal government
play a central role in enforcing the standards established. Congress has in-
voked its authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and regulate commerce, to address the major areas of discrimination
faced daily by people with disabilities.' 95
The strong mandate of the Americans With Disabilities Act coupled with
the IDEA demonstrate clear Congressional intent to provide for the needs of
disabled persons.' 96 This mandate, along with the weight of case authority,
demands a broad reading of the provisions of the IDEA to accomplish the
Congressional purpose of providing a free, appropriate, public education to
children with disabilities.19
7
Great strides have been made in opening doors that previously have been
closed to the disabled.' 98 Clovis provides a foothold for those who would
deny services and opportunities to disabled individuals, while hiding behind
the cause of fiscal responsibility.' 99 "Together, these last two years, we've
191. Id. § 2(a)(4)-(5).
192. Id. § 2(a)(5).
193. Id. § 2(a)(9).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 2(b).
196. Federal Ruling Requires Transit Vehicle Access, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 4, 1990, at
13A (stating that the Department of Transportation, acting to implement the Americans with
Disabilities Act, requires that transit authorities across the country now purchase only buses,
vans, and rail cars that are accessible to the disabled).
197. 134 CONG. REC., supra note 182, at S16,243.
198. Emily Van Ness, For the Learning Disabled, College Can Be As Easy As 1-2-3, N.Y.
TiMEs, April 9, 1989, § A4 (Education Life), at 47.
199. Huefner, supra note 11, at 436-37.
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... unshackled the potential of Americans with disabilities." 2" Now is not
the time to slow this progress.
David C. Donohue
200. President George Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 1991) (text available in
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1991, at A14).
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tance .... When the school officials in Kruelle attempted to defer re-
sponsibility by saying that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act7 4 provided the appropriate funding source, the court deter-
mined that Congress intended to use federal funds to assist the States in
meeting the requirements of the IDEA.7" This additional funding alleviates
the perceived inequities of placing the financial burden on the educational
authorities alone.76
III. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF
DEFINING RELATED SERVICES
Board of Education v. Rowley77 was the first case in which the Supreme
Court interpreted any provision of the IDEA.7' The Court in Rowley found
that the IDEA did not require a sign language interpreter to be provided to a
hearing-impaired child where the child was able to perform better than the
average student in her class and easily advanced from grade to grade without
the service.79 The Court determined that the intent of the IDEA was "more
to open the door of public education to . children [with disabilities] on
appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once
inside."8 ° The Court held that if instruction was provided with sufficient
support services to permit the disabled child to benefit from the education,
73. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1425, 1448.
[W]ithout this requirement, there is an abdication of responsibility for the education
of... children [with disabilities] .... While the committee understands that differ-
ent agencies may, in fact, deliver services, the responsibility must remain in a central
agency overseeing the education of ... children [with disabilities], so that failure to
deliver services or the violation of the rights of ... children [with disabilities] is
squarely the responsibility of one agency.
Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1991).
75. Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 691.
76. Id. at 698 (citing S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1447). Congress did not intend to remove from the disabled the burden of
insufficient funds and to place it upon the local school boards. Rather, it pinpointed $161.7
million in alternative federal funds available to the states to aid in fulfilling its responsibilities
of educating those with disabilities. Id.
77. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
78. Zirkel, supra note 7, at 467.
79. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 210.
80. Id. at 192. The Court looked into the legislative history and found a repeated empha-
sis on access and procedures. It then looked at the mainstreaming preference in the Act and to
the prevailing practices in the schools, concluding that where a child is educated in a regular
classroom, the grading and advancement system is a factor in determining appropriateness of
placement. Id.; see also Zirkel, supra note 7, at 477-78.
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the child received a free appropriate public education. 8'
As a result of the Court's interpretation of the IDEA, the School Board
was not required to maximize the potential of each disabled child. s2 Rather,
the School Board met its obligation under IDEA by providing personalized
instruction and services reasonably calculated to bring about educational
benefit to the child.83 However, Rowley affirmed the educational rights of
disabled children. These rights include: (1) attending public schools free of
charge; (2) individualized, beneficial, and meaningful services; (3) main-
streaming where possible; (4) instructional programs that approximate the
grade levels used in the education program for nondisabled children; (5) pro-
vision of related and supportive services necessary for the children to benefit
from their special education; (6) active involvement by parents or guardians
in the planning of their child's education; (7) the opportunity to challenge
the adequacy of education programs in school hearings; and (8) the ability to
challenge in federal court the substance of the IEP and the procedures af-
forded for its development and review.
8 4
In Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 5 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether clean intermittent catheterization (CIC)"6
should be considered a related service under the IDEA. 7 The plaintiff, Am-
ber, was an eight-year-old student suffering from spina bifida. As a result,
she had a neurogenic bladder, preventing her from emptying her bladder
voluntarily, and had to be catheterized every three to four hours."8 Amber
was too young to perform the procedure of CIC herself and needed the
assistance of a trained school nurse.8 9
The Court found that, without help in performing this procedure, Amber
was unable to attend class, and thus did not have access to the education
that she was entitled to.9' The Court looked to Rowley and noted that Con-
gress intended to make public education available to disabled children and
81. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189.
82. Id. at 199. "Whatever Congress meant by an appropriate education, it is clear it did
not mean a potential-maximizing education." Id. at 197 n.21.
83. Osborne, supra note 8, at 22.
84. Beyer, supra note 9, at 52. See generally Henry A. Beyer, A Free Appropriate Public
Education, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 363 (1983); Zirkel, supra note 7; Gerry, supra note 48, at
2 (1987).
85. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
86. CIC is a simple procedure performed to avoid kidney injury which can be performed
in a few minutes by a layperson with less than an hour's training. Id. at 883.
87. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 895.
